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In the previous issue, I analysed a New Zealand
case known as the ‘cyber memory’ case, which
restricted court reporting on the internet and
attracted world-wide media coverage and interest.
In this note I report on the final outcome of that
case, and on a prominent retrial in the High Court
in which the judge has been very concerned about
media using live streaming on the internet to
report the on-going trial.
In the ‘cyber-memory’ case, Judge Harvey initially made
a partial non-publication order which allowed the
publication of reports about the particular proceedings
in contemporaneous broadcasts or publications, but
prohibited accounts on the internet, or by way of
placing stored audio, video or text files on the internet.1
In reviewing the decision, he affirmed it for reasons
detailed in my previous note.2 These decisions were not
well received, particularly by New Zealand media and
overseas commentators such as American bloggers who
suggested such orders restricted freedom of expression
and were unenforceable. 
In the original two decisions, the judge was
attempting to pre-empt a ‘cyber memory’ effect which
he considered would turn harmless contemporary
publication of material about the early trial proceedings
into prejudicial publication a year later during the actual
trial. However, as he completed the reasons for the
second decision, Judge Harvey received late
submissions from media interests. He agreed to hear
further argument, and on 12 September 2008, APN
Holdings, Fairfax, TVNZ, Mediaworks, RNZ and NZPA
applied for an order that the original non-publication
order be set aside. I noted previously that it seemed
likely that any third decision would have to deal directly
with arguments relating to the Bill of Rights, with the
scope of the order and once again, with enforceability
and effectiveness. This proved to be the case.
The application to set aside the original order was
granted, for several reasons.3 First, the judge appeared
to recognise that his reasoning might not pass scrutiny
under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. Under
that Act, any decision which might limit freedom of
expression must balance the competing interests at
stake, to ensure that any limitation which results is not
disproportionate to the harm it is attempting to cure.
Counsel for the media interests argued that the judge
had not done this previously, in that the earlier orders
had been made to deal with concerns which were
merely hypothetical.4 An alternative argument was made
that any Bill of Rights balancing should favour
publication, and suppression should be based on
specific prejudice or truly extreme circumstances from
which prejudice can be inferred.5 Here the judge
acknowledged the harm he had identified was only
potential – in fact it was insufficiently identified.6 This
was because any prejudice to a later fair trial was
simply a vague unclarified one that had not yet
crystallized. The judge did not find any prejudice in
releasing the names of the offenders to mainstream
media at the initial stages, and so was simply guessing
about the later effects of this information, or indeed any
other information, on a later trial.
Second, Judge Harvey accepted that his theory about
‘documents that do not die’ because of the internet was
mitigated by clear evidence he received that media
1 Police v PIK [2008] DCR 853.
2 New Zealand Police v PIKOrs, Unreported, Youth
Court, Manukau, CRI 2008-292-000378, 3
September 2008, Judge Harvey. See Ursula Cheer,
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3 New Zealand Police v PIKOrs, Unreported, Youth
Court, Manukau, CRI 2008-292-000378, 19
September 2008.
4 Ibid, [30].
5 Ibid, [31]-[32].
6 Ibid, [52]-[53].
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would be well-able to remove stored information on the
internet if it was found later to be prejudicial to an
impending trial – in fact, he thought it could be removed
for a particular purpose or for a particular period of
time. This ability would have a subsidiary or indirect
effect on third party search engines which update their
indices, although the judge acknowledged that all
instances of the material would not necessarily be
eliminated from the internet, as it could be retained in
archived sites or on social networking or blog sites.
However, the judge’s main concern, that relating to the
retention of threads from mainstream media on-line
coverage, would be removed.7
The judge did not accept that making an order apply
to a particular medium such as the internet was
discriminatory, however. He thought that assumptions
about non-publication orders based on pre-digital
information forms of control which could be enforced
against centralised organisations have been displaced
and now require a different approach. The judge
referred to the internet as a ‘new paradigm for the
availability and dissemination of information.’8 He
concluded that there may be cases in the future when
orders will be made based on differentiation between
media in relation to non-publication. Judge Harvey was
satisfied that ‘the solution posed by a problem arising
from the technology has a solution within the
technology.’9
He acknowledged that partial orders suppressing
aspects of reporting on the internet will never remove
all worrying material from circulation, but in his view,
they will be effective enough if they remove most of the
material from most of the relevant audience group. The
judge thought that any information retained in the
system would be likely to be harder to retrieve and
content may be ‘buried in the noise’ with the average
juror lacking the technical skill to retrieve much.10
Therefore Judge Harvey concluded that although a
partial order was inappropriate in this case, they remain
a valid weapon in the arsenal available to judges to
protect the right to a fair trial. In the general course of
such cases, defence counsel may apply for partial
suppression orders as a trial approaches or during it,
and it would be expected that the trial judge would also
give clear instructions to the jurors not to search the
internet if such concerns exist. This sort of practical
approach is becoming the norm.
The retrial
The internet has also been a concern in relation to
media reporting a prominent three-month murder retrial
in the High Court at Christchurch. R v David Cullen Bain11
is the retrial of a now notorious murder case which
resulted in Mr Bain being imprisoned in 1995.12 The
judge in this case, Justice Pankhurst, has been
maintaining a meticulously cautious approach to
applications by the media to cover the retrial in various
forms. It is not hard to understand why. The venue has
already been moved to ensure a fair trial for Bain. There
is enormous public interest, and considerable public
funds have been expended on the case. It is currently
New Zealand’s most famous retrial.
As is often the case now, it was the issue of internet
coverage which caused some difficulty. As in the cyber-
memory case detailed above, it is clear that the media
need to fully inform the court what and how they intend
to publish and how technology is being used. In Bain,
the judge has had to deal with a court where the
members of the media attending have overflowed into
the public galleries. Applications for television, radio
and still photography were granted, subject to the In-
Court Media Coverage Guidelines 2003.13 The media has
had to cooperate, by sharing images to support
decisions of the judge to limit the number of cameras
allowed in the court and to restrict where filming may
occur. The large numbers of the public wishing to attend
the trial have been accommodated in an additional
room in which CCTV footage of proceedings has been
made available.
Additionally, print, television and on-line media
applied to provide video coverage on their websites. The
judge initially declined, because the media guidelines
do not currently deal with internet coverage. Justice
Pankhurst was not prepared to step outside these when
the effects and implications of the new technology have
not yet been considered. However, on hearing from the
media, he granted approval for delayed internet
coverage. This meant streaming could occur with a 10
minute delay and providing the relevant guidelines are
applied as well. A day later, it became apparent to the
court that TV3 was providing delayed streaming on its
website, after it had ceased to pursue an application for
7 Ibid, [54]-[57].
8 Ibid, [49].
9 Ibid, [56].
10 Ibid, [68].
11 High Court, Christchurch, CRI 1994-012, CRI 2007-
412, Panckhurst J.
12 R v Bain High Court, Dunedin, T1/95, 21 June 1995,
Williamson J. See also Karam v Solicitor General
Unreported, High Court, Auckland, 20 August 1999,
AP 50/98, Gendall J, which involved breach of a
suppression order in the original trial by Mr Karam,
who wrote and published a book about it (Joe
Karam, David and Goliath (1997, Reed
Publishing)). Mr Karam has strongly advocated Mr
Bain’s innocence and is assisting the defence in
the current retrial.
13 References to the application decisions cannot be
published at this point in the trial.
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live streaming. The court revised the previous ruling and
limited any internet coverage to conventional news
coverage. Streaming was not permitted. Justice
Panckhurst made it clear that the main reason for the
decision was to prevent any coverage which would
allow witnesses to observe the trial in advance of giving
evidence.
Examination of mainstream media websites at this
time revealed a wealth of video footage that could be
downloaded about the Bain retrial while it was taking
place. These do not give the full picture of the trial
which live streaming would supply. However, arguably a
witness who has not yet given evidence could build up a
small or large, but rather disjointed, picture of the trial
by looking at such websites. Such witnesses would be
required to give evidence uninfluenced by any coverage
they have seen, and to speak the truth as they know it
to be. Clearly prohibiting live streaming can prevent
some information being available to potential
witnesses, but much video material is available in any
event, and arguably live streaming would in fact give a
more accurate picture than the extensive video coverage
currently available on-line. It may be that a robust
instruction to witnesses is the best approach in any
event.
Questions about on-line coverage will continue to
arise in relation to court reporting. In such cases, the
courts, as they are required to do, must attempt to
come to grips with new technology. However, they also
rely on media for important information about how
technology is affecting the industry. At the least, it
seems clear the In-court Media Coverage Guidelines will
need amendment to give assistance to the judiciary on
the matter of on-line reporting.
Postscript
David Bain was acquitted on 5 June 2009. The
blogosphere is alive with discussion both supporting
and challenging the verdict.
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